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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF 'i'HE . 
STATE OF UTAH 
************* 
GILBERT CAPSON and LINDA 
CAPSON, his wife, 
vs. 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
A. J. DEMI READY MIX CONCRETE 
COMPANY and ARCTIC CIRCLE, INC., 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
************** 
APPELLMJTS ' BRIEF 
************** 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE: 
CASE !JO, 
14524 
This is an action for damages for personal injuries 
sustained by the Plaintiff, GILBBRT CAPSON, in an industrial 
accident, allegedly as the result of the negligence of the 
Defendant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT: 
The District Court, per JUDGE DAVID B. DEE, granted 
Defendant, A. J. DEAN READY MIX CONCRETE COMPANY, /.lotion for 
Sur.unary Judgment and dismissed the action with prejudice. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL: 
Appellants seek the reversal of the Judgment below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
On or about July 26, 1972, the Appellant, GILBERT 
cAPSON, \vas subcontractor doing foundation work for ARCTIC 
CIRCLE, INC. This work was taking place on the prer.1ises of 
ARCTIC CIRCLE at 1700 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
ARCTIC CIRCLE was the general contractor on the 
job and had already completed doing the excavation work. This 
excavation was approximately FIVE (5) feet below grade level. 
It 1;a" the Appellant's responsibility to complete the foundation 
work inside of the excavation. 
Concrete for the foundation was ordered from A. J. 
DBAN READY !UX CONCRETE COMPANY I the Respondent herein. The 
concrete was to.be poured into the forms provided and set up 
by the Appellant. _While the Appellant was __ in the process of 
pouring concrete into the forms, the bank on which the A. J. 
DEAN COMPANY truck was sitting gave way, severely injuriny the 
Appellant. This action was commenced against ARCTIC CIRCLE and 
A. J. DEAN READY MIX COMPAUY. In a prior action, Judge Sawaya 
dismissed Co-Defendant ARCTIC CIRCLE on the basis that Appellant 
failed to state a cause of action against the Defendant, ARCTIC 
CIRCLE. Appellant appealed the dismissal to the Utah State Supreme 
Court, which affirmed the District court's dismissal on November 
4, 1976. capson v. A. J. Dean Ready Mix Concrete co. and 
2 
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Arctic Circle, Inc., 556 P.2d 505. 
On September 8, 1977, the Third Judicial Di:trict 
Court, per JUDGE DAVID B. DEE, granted Respondent's notion 
for Sununary Judgment. This appeal followed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT ARE NOT 
CO-EMPLOYEES UNDER u.c.A. § 35-1-42. 
In its .Memorandum of points and authorities in 
support of its Motion for Summary Judgment, Respondent clainec 
that Appellant and Respondent were "co-employees" under LC,;., 
§35-1-42; therefore, any injury caused by Respondent was cm- ' 
pensable only under the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is 
Respondent's rationale that since U. C.A. §35-1-42 makes both 
Respondent and Appellant employees of ARCTIC CIRCLE, that the; 
were co-enployee s. Therefore, Under U. C. A. § 3 5-1-6 0 AJJ!-OeLor.'. 
is precluded from suit· against Respondent. But Respondent's 
rationale is faulty. As Justice Maughan pointed out in his 
dissenting opinion in Shupe vs. Wasatch Electric Company, Inc. 
546 P.2d 869, U.C.A. §35-1-42 is divided up into TWO (2) sub-
sections-- the first section defining "statutory employer" ans: 
second section defines "statutory employee". Justice Maug~ 
interpreted the statute in this way: 
The language of §35-1-42 clearly shows .. , 
a legislative intent. The initial section provw~ 
The following shall constitute employers 
subject to the provision of this title: Title is 
the key word here. Thus, the definition of 
§42 insofar as a "statutory employer" is 
involved is to be applied to 
3 
• 
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the entire act. In contrast, Subsection 2 
provides those who are deemed "statutory 
employees" are made so only for the purpose 
of that section. Section is the key word. 
The pertinent provisions of Subsection 2 are: 
Where any employer procures any work to 
be done wh0lly or in part for him by a contractor 
over whose work he retains supervision or control, 
and such work is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer, such contractor, and all 
persons employed by him, and also contractors 
under him, shall be deemed within the meaning of 
this section, employees of such original employer 
The legislature specifically has expressed 
an intention that its definition of "statutory 
employer" remain constant throughout the 
Workmen's Compensation Act •.. It is expressly 
confined to those provisions wherein the 
responsibility flowing to them from the "statutory 
employer" is set forth. 
'1'hus :ust because Respondent and Appellant may be "statutory 
employees" of ARCTIC CIRCLE, they are not co-employees under 
U.C.A. §35-1-60; and therefore, that section is not applicable. 
To hold otherwise would completely ignore the clear intention 
of the legislature and the underlying policy under U.C.A. §35-1-42. 
Again, quoting Justice Maughan: 
The concept of "all persons in the same 
employment" does not include subcontractors, their 
employees on the same project; thus, they are not 
irnmuned as co-employees of the emtloyer of an 
employee of ~1 c;eneral contractor. (emphasis added) 
The legislature in enacting §35-1-42 was 
not concerned with third party tort liability; 
its purpose was to establish a general statutory 
definition of an employer, to assure that a general 
contractor would guarantee compensation for the 
employees of a subcontractor. Where a statute such 
as §35-1-42 makes the 0eneral contract.or the employer 
12 Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, §72.20, 
Pp. -~-44 to 14-46. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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for t~~ purposes of the compensation statute 
certainly he should enjoy the regular 1·r= · , •uuUn1 t" 
of an employer from third party suit when the ' 
facts are such that he could be made liable 
for compensat~on. The majority of the Courts 
have so held. 
Further, Larson on Workmen's Compensation 
Laws states: 
•• overall responsibility of the 
general contractor for getting subcontractors 
insured, and his latent liability for compen-
sation if he does not, should be sufficient to 
remove him from the category of "third party". 
He is under a continuing potential liability; 
he has thus assumed the burden in exchange for 
which he might well be entitled to immunity 
from damage suits, regardless of whether on the 
facts of a particular case actual liability exists, I 
In the present case, ve have a subcontractor bring1:.: 
I 
suit against another subcontractor. Neither of the subcontract\ 
had any insurance that would cover the other subccnt1-,:.ct0:; nor. 
\.;ere they under any obligation to Luy any insurance covering tr: 
other subcontractor. Thus, neither should be given the irnnumt 
provided by U.C.A. §35-1-60. 
POIHT II. 
AFFIRMANCE OF THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION CONFLICT 
DIRECTLY WITH U .C .A. §35-1-62. 
If this Court should affirm the Lower Court's 
decision in granting Summary Judgment, U.C.A. §35-1-62 would i 
become meaningless. The pertinent provisions of §35-1-62 provJ 
p. 14-47. 
When any injury or death for which compen-
sation is payable under this title, shall have 
2 2 Larson's ~·lorkmen' s Compensation Law, §72.3l, 
5 
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been caused by a wrongful act or neglect of 
~n~ther person not in the same employment, the 
inJured employee, or in the case of h1-s aeath 
his dependents may claim compensation and the' 
injure~ employee or his heirs or personal repre-
sentative may also have an action for damages against 
such third person. 
This section allows an employee to bring suit against 
a person "not in the same employment" to r.-.cover damages resulting 
from the wrongful act or negligence of another person. In cases 
previously decided by this Court, it has been held that a sub-
contractor or any of his employees cannot bring suit against the 
general contractor. Adamson vs. Oakland Construction company, 
508 P.2d 805 (1973), and Smith vs. Brown, 493 P.2d 994 (1971). 
Conversely, it has been held that the general contractor or his 
employee cannot maintain an action for damages against a sub-
contractor. Gallegos vs. Stringham, 442 P.2d 31 (1968); Shupe 
vs. Wasatch Electrical Company, Inc., Supra; and Peterson vs. 
Fowler, 493 P.2d 997 and 510 P.2d 523. If now this Court were to 
hold that subcontractors are co-employees under U.C.A. §35-1-60, 
it would proclude any suits between persons who work on the same 
job. Thus, u.c.A. §35-1-62 would have little or no application. 
Under the Lower Court's ruling, wherein subcontractors are 
prohibited from bringing suit against other subcontractors, 
Ap;)ellant cannot imagine any situation in which any class working 
on the saue joL could sue another class working on that job;and 
therefore, under the lower court's ruling, U.C.A. §35-1-62 would be 
meaningless. On the other hand, if this Court were to hold that 
even though the Respondent is a statutory employee of .i\RC'I'IC CIRC:.'...Er 
6 
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he is not necessarily a co-employee of the Appellant 
s Under 
U.C.A. §35-1-60. Therefore, the Appellant should be able~ 
bring suit against.the Respondent if he meets the l' qua if icatior 
of U.C.A. §35-1-62. This interpretation of the above-quot~ 
statutes would give some meaning to U.C.A. §35-1-60. 
As to the questions as whether the Appellant can~ 
under U.C.A. §35-1-62, the case of Peterson vs. Fowler, Supra, 
seems to be very helpful. This case was twice brought before t 
Supreme Court. In that case, an employee of the general contro:i 
was assigned by the general contractor to assist a subcontractc: 
in putting ceiling tile on the top of a large sports arena. 1" 
order to place the ceiling tile, the subcontractor and his 
employees used a scaffold set up by a scaffolding company. In, 
the process -of applying the ceiling tile, the scaffolds fell ar.. 
the general contractor's employee was killed. His personal re1: 
sentative brought suit against the subcontractor, the 
architect, the company that supplied the scaffolding and the cq 
that erected the scaffolding. In the first case, the Supreme(,:' 
held that the employee was working under the control of the sut· 
contractor and therefore was engaged in the "same employment": 
the subcontractor. In the second case, 510 P. 2cl 523, the Courtl 
that the company that furnished the scaffolding and the subcond 
that built the scaffolding were not in the "same employment" wrl 
deceased employee. The Court pointed out that the company that 
supplied the scaffolding was simply a mc;terialman to the sub-
t " as tr contractor and therefore was not in the "same employmen 
subcontractor or the decedent. 
7 
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The present case seer.is to be very srnilar. In the 
present case, the Respondent was merely a materialman to ARCTIC 
CIRCLE. Therefore, it cannot be said that it was in the "same 
employment" as the Appellant. And as Justice Maughan pointed 
out in his dissent in Shupe: 
The definition of a third party "not in 
the same employment" is not the subject of 
§35-1-42 (2). The concept of "all persons in 
the same employment" does not include sub-
contractors, and their employees on the same 
project; thus, they are not irnmuned as co-
employees of an employee of a general contractor. 
(Emphasis added) 
CONCLUSION 
The manner in which U.C.A. §35-1-42 was drafted makes 
it clear that the legislature did not intend to make the Appellant 
and the Respondent co-employees. Although it is true that both 
Respondent and Appellant may have been statutory employees of 
ARCTIC CIRCLE for the purposes of U.C.A. §35-1-42, this does net 
mean that they were co-employees for the purposes of U.C.A. §35-1-
60, or engaged in the same employment with the purpose of U.C.A. 
§35-1-62. If this Court were to uphold the Lower Court's decision 
granting Summary Judgment, it would be saying that a subcontractor 
is barred from bringing suit against another subcontractor, and 
would thus make u.c.A. §35-1-62 a nullity. 
The Appellant respectfully asks the Court to reverse 
the Trial Court's decision and remand this case for a trial on the 
merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FULLMER & HARDING 
_, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Mailed TWO l2) copies of the foregoing Appellant's 
Brief to TIMOTHY R. HANSEN, Esq. Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent, A.J. DEAN READY MIX CONCRETE COMPANY, 702 Kearns 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 on this r;)i--~ay of 
December, 1977. 
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